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"NO SINNERS UNDER MY ROOF": CAN
CALIFORNIA LANDLORDS REFUSE TO RENT
TO UNMARRIED COUPLES BY CLAIMING A
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM OF EXERCISE
EXEMPTION FROM A STATUTE WHICH
PROHIBITS MARITAL STATUS
DISCRIMINATION?
I. INTRODUCTION
In Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission, a
landlady, based on her religious convictions, refused to rent
an apartment to an unmarried couple.1 She sincerely be-
lieved that sex outside of marriage was sinful and that rent-
ing to a couple who engaged in such conduct would be a sin as
well.2 For that reason, the landlady claimed that she should
be exempt from a California statute that prohibits discrimi-
nation on the basis of marital status.3
In 1993, the Supreme Court of California accepted for re-
view a case with similar facts, Donahue v. Fair Employment
& Housing Commission.4 However, the court eventually dis-
missed the review as "improvidently granted."5 Then, in Sep-
tember 1994, the court agreed to consider Smith v. Fair Em-
ployment & Housing Commission.6 Thus, the issue stands
before the California Supreme Court once more: whether a
private landlady is entitled to a constitutional religious free-
dom exemption from a statute which prohibits marital status
discrimination.7
In an attempt to resolve the issue, this comment will
summarize Smith," and then outline the court's reasoning in
1. Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395 (Ct.
App.), rev. granted and opinion superseded, 880 P.2d 111 (Cal. 1994).
2. Id. at 397.
3. Id. at 398.
4. 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (1991), rev. granted and opinion superseded, 825 P.2d
766 (Cal. 1992), rev. dismissed, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993).
5. Id.
6. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395 (Ct. App.), rev. granted and opinion superseded,
880 P.2d 111 (Cal. 1994).
7. Id. at 398.
8. See infra part II.A.
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Donahue.9 Next, it examines cases of marital status discrimi-
nation in California, first, by a public landlord, 10 then by a
private landlord who did not claim a freedom of religion ex-
emption from the statute.1 1 Further, this comment will ana-
lyze how the highest courts of other states have solved the
problem of religious freedom exemptions. 12 So far, only three
state supreme courts - Minnesota,1 3 Massachusetts,1 4 and
Alaska1 r - have attempted to tackle this sensitive and con-
troversial issue.
Finally, it suggests that the California Supreme Court
should refuse to grant the landlady in Smith a religious free-
dom exemption.16 This comment, however, will not address
the issue of whether the California Supreme Court should
use the compelling interest test or the incidental effect test in
deciding the issue. 17 It is assumed, for the sake of argument,
that the State must pass the higher threshold of the compel-
ling interest test in order to prevail in this case."8
II. BACKGROUND
A. California: Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing
Commission
Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission in-
volved Evelyn Smith, a member of the Bidwell Presbyterian
Church in Chico and owner of two duplexes, and Gail Randall
and Kenneth Phillips, an unmarried couple. 19 Smith regu-
larly refused to rent to unmarried couples.2 ° She did so based
on her religious belief that nonmarital sex was sinful, and
that she would be guilty of a sin herself if she rented to people
9. See infra part II.B.
10. See infra part 1I.C.1.
11. See infra part II.C.2.
12. See infra part II.D.
13. See State ex rel. Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990).
14. See Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994).
15. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska
1994).
16. See discussion infra parts IV, V.
17. See infra note 31 and text accompanying note 180 for explanation of the
constitutional tests.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 205, 236-37.
19. Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395, 397
(Ct. App.), rev. granted and opinion superseded, 880 P.2d 111 (Cal. 1994).
20. Id.
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who were committing the sin.2 ' She usually informed couples
who were interested in her units that she preferred renting to
married people.22 At first, the couple told Smith that they
were married, but before moving in they admitted that they
were not.23 The landlady canceled their agreement, returned
their deposit, and refused to rent to them.2 '
The court of appeal established that Smith violated Gov-
ernment Code section 12955, subsections (a) and (d),25 which
provide that it shall be unlawful:
(a) For the owner of any housing accommodation to
discriminate against any person because of the... mari-
tal status ... of that person.
(d) For any person subject to the provisions of Section
51 of the Civil Code, to discriminate against any person
because of ... marital status . . . or on any other basis
prohibited by that section.26
However, the court of appeal also decided that the statute
conflicted with Smith's religious belief.27
The issue before the court of appeal was, therefore,
"whether plaintiff [was] constitutionally entitled to exemp-
tion from the operation of a statute designed to eliminate
housing discrimination against unmarried couples where the
enforcement of the statute [would] interfere with plaintiff's
free exercise of religion."
28
1. Federal Constitutional Law
In deciding this issue, the court of appeal considered both
federal 29 and California law.30 As far as federal law was con-
cerned, the court followed Department of Human Resources of
21. Id.
22. Id. Smith in fact rented to single, divorced and widowed people. Id.
23. Id.
24. Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395, 397
(Ct. App.), rev. granted and opinion superseded, 880 P.2d 111 (Cal. 1994).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 398 n. 1 (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 412. The Commission had no doubt as to the sincerity of Smith's
religious convictions. Id. at 398.
28. Id. at 398.
29. Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395, 399-
408 (Ct. App.), rev. granted and opinion superseded, 880 P.2d 111 (Cal. 1994).
The concurring opinion stated that the federal constitutional analysis applied
by the majority was unnecessary because the state law protected freedom of
religion as well. Id. at 412-13 (Raye, A.J., concurring).
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Oregon, Employment Division v. Smith.3 1 Relying on that
case, the court stated that if a law was neutral and generally
applicable, no religious exercise exemption should be
granted.3 2 However, the United States Supreme Court also
suggested in the Peyote Case that such free exercise of reli-
gion exemptions had been granted in "hybrid" situations.3 3
"Hybrid" cases occur when religious exercise is implicated to-
gether with another First Amendment freedom, such as free-
dom of speech or freedom of the press.3 4
The court of appeal recognized the case to be the type of
hybrid situation discussed in the Peyote Case.35 According to
the Smith court, not only was the landlady's freedom of reli-
gion implicated, but her freedom of speech was implicated as
well.3 6 Her freedom of speech was violated by the Commis-
sion's order that the landlady "post notices on her property
proclaiming concepts and rules which [were] antithetical to
her religious beliefs and sign them as if to make them her
own.
"37
30. Id. at 408-13. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides in part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
The California Constitution guarantees the "free exercise and enjoyment of reli-
gion." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4.
31. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) [hereinafter Peyote Case]. The issue in the Peyote
Case was whether the criminal prohibition of religious use of peyote was consti-
tutional under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution. Id. The Court held that the prohibition was constitu-
tional. Id. at 890. The Court reasoned that the Free Exercise Clause prohibited
governmental regulation of religious beliefs but not practices. Id. at 878-82.
According to the Court, individuals must comply with the law regardless of
their religious beliefs. Id. The Court rejected the test used in Sherbert v. Ver-
ner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), which balanced government interest in enforcing a
statute against the burden such a statute imposed on religious practice. Id. at
885. The Smith Court explained that the Sherbert test should not be used with
a generally applicable criminal law. Id. at 885. Otherwise, citizens would be
free to not obey a law when it conflicted with their religious beliefs and the
government interest was not compelling.
32. Smith, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 400.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in
part: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech." U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
37. Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395, 401
(Ct. App.), rev. granted and opinion superseded, 880 P.2d 111 (Cal. 1994). The
Smith court stated:
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Since a hybrid situation required a compelling interest
test, the court decided on the basis of the Peyote Case that the
state, in order to prevail, had to show that it had a compelling
interest in protecting unmarried couples from discrimination
in housing.38 That interest should be significant enough "to
outweigh plaintiff's right . . . to free exercise and free
speech."3 9
Having established the standard, the court then ana-
lyzed the state's interest.40 According to the court of appeal,
the interest was significant but not compelling. 41 The court
perceived the interest as significant because the legislature
decided to add provisions prohibiting marital status and sex
discrimination to the statute which previously forbade dis-
crimination only on the basis of race, creed, and color.42
The interest in protecting unmarried couples from mari-
tal status discrimination was also seen by the court as signifi-
cant because other California appellate court opinions inter-
preted the term "marital status" to include unmarried
couples.43 Nevertheless, the Smith court did not view the
state interest as compelling or overriding.44 Despite the fact
that California statutes prohibited discrimination based on
marital status, and the statutes were interpreted to protect
unmarried couples, the court stated that the legislature did
Plaintiff was ordered to post in her rental units for a period of 90 days
notice announcing she had been adjudicated in violation of FEHA for
refusing to rent to prospective tenants because they were an unmar-
ried couple. She was ordered to post permanently in her rental units a
notice to rental applicants of their rights and remedies under FEHA
generally and specifically with regard to discrimination against un-
married couples. Plaintiff was ordered to sign both notices and to pro-
vide copies to each person thereafter who expressed interest in renting
from plaintiff.
Id. at 397-98.
38. Id. at 401.
39. Id. at 403.
40. Id. at 404-05.
41. Id. at 404.
42. Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395, 404
(Ct. App.), rev. granted and opinion superseded, 880 P.2d 111 (Cal. 1994).
43. Id. (citing Hess v. Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 187 Cal. Rptr.
712, 714 (Ct. App. 1982) and Atkisson v. Kern County Hous. Auth., 130 Cal.
Rptr. 375, 381 (Ct. App. 1976)).
44. Id.
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not intend prohibitions against discrimination on the various
other grounds to be of equal importance.45
2. State Constitutional Law
After the Smith court decided that, according to the
United States Constitution, the State did not have a compel-
ling interest in protecting unmarried couples from housing
discrimination, it proceeded to discuss the California Consti-
tution.46 The court determined that the California Constitu-
tion had a broader scope than the Federal Constitution.
4 7
Therefore, under the California Constitution, the State car-
ried a heavier burden of proof in order to justify infringement
on religious freedom.48 According to the Smith court, the Cal-
ifornia Constitution required the State to pass a compelling
interest test.4 9
Ultimately, the Smith court reached the same result
under the California law as under the federal law.5 0 The
court decided that the State failed to prove a compelling in-
terest in preventing discrimination against unmarried
couples in housing.5' The landlady was, therefore, entitled to
a religious freedom exemption from the state statute.52
B. Donahue v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission
Donahue v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission"
was the only California appellate court case decided before
45. Id. at 404. The court explained that, "it cannot be said that the goal of
eliminating discrimination on the basis of unmarried status enjoys equal prior-
ity with the state public policy of eliminating racial discrimination." Id.
46. Id. at 408.
47. Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 408 (Ct.
App.), rev. granted and opinion superseded, 880 P.2d 111 (Cal. 1994). The court
quoted Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, 82 P.2d 391, 395 (Cal. 1938): "[Olur state
Constitution contains an express guaranty of freedom of religion ... [while tihe
federal Constitution does not contain a similar express provision . . . ." Id. at
409; see also supra note 30.
48. Id.
49. Id.; see supra note 31.
50. Smith, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 409.
51. Id. at 412.
52. Id. at 410.
53. 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (Ct. App. 1991), rev. granted and opinion superseded,
825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992), rev. dismissed, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993). Donahue
cannot be cited by courts as authority because the court depublished the
decision.
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Smith54 which concerned the same issues. In Donahue, the
landlords, Agnes and John Donahue, refused to rent to Verna
Terry and Robert Wilder because they were unmarried.5"
The Donahues did not rent to unmarried couples as a rule,
prompted by their religious belief that sex outside of mar-
riage was a mortal sin, and that aiding someone in commit-
ting a sin was sinful as well.57
1. Marital Status
When the Donahue case reached the appellate court, one
of the court's tasks was to determine whether Government
Code section 12955 protected unmarried couples from hous-
ing discrimination.58 Therefore, the court examined the leg-
islative intent behind the statute.5 9 In inferring the legisla-
tive intent, the court found helpful "the chronology of
relevant case law."60 It is generally assumed that the legisla-
ture is aware of court decisions. 61 The legislature is supposed
to amend statutes "in light of such decisions which have a
direct bearing on the statute."62
54. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395 (Ct App.), rev. granted and opinion superseded, 880
P.2d 111 (Cal. 1994).
55. See supra part II.A. The first issue in Donahue was whether the statute
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of marital status protected unmarried
couples, and the second, whether the landlords were entitled to a constitution-
ally based religious exemption from laws which protect unmarried couples from
discrimination in housing. Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 35, 38.
56. Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32, 33
(Ct. App. 1991), rev. granted and opinion superseded, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992),
rev. dismissed, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993).
57. Id. at 33 n.1.
58. Id. at 36. Government Code § 12955 provides that it shall be unlawful:
(b) For the owner of any housing accommodation to make or to
cause to be made any written or oral inquiry concerning the ... marital
status . . .of any person seeking to . . .rent or lease any housing
accommodation.
(c) For any person to make, print, or publish, or cause to be made,
printed, or published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with re-
spect to the sale or rental of a housing accommodation that indicates
any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on ... marital sta-
tus . . .or an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or
discrimination.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12955 (Deering Supp. 1995). .
59. Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. at 36-39.
60. Id. at 37.
61. Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32, 37
(Ct. App. 1991), rev. granted and opinion superseded, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992),
rev. dismissed, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993).
62. Id.
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The Donahue court explained the rule regarding legisla-
tive intent as follows: when a particular subject of law stands
before the legislature, and the legislature changes the law in
some respects but not in others, then legislative intent can be
inferred from such action.6 3 Lack of change in the law in
such circumstances means, according to the court, that the
legislature intended to leave the unamended portion as it
stood.64 The Donahue court used this reasoning to conclude
that the California Legislature intended to include married
as well as unmarried couples in the term "marital status."65
Moreover, the Donahue court stated that if a statute con-
tained an exception to a general rule, no other exception
should be implied.66 In Government Code section 12955(b),
the legislature created an exception from the prohibition of
marital status discrimination in housing only for college and
university housing.67 From the presence of such a narrow ex-
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See id. The Donahue court noted that after the prohibition of marital
status discrimination had been enacted, the California appellate court in Atkis-
son v. Kern County Housing Authority, 130 Cal. Rptr. 375 (Ct. App. 1976), ap-
plied the prohibition to unmarried couples. Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. at 37. Citing
Atkisson, the court stated that the statute was an expression of the state's pol-
icy. Id. Four years after Atkisson, the legislature repealed and reenacted, with
changes, the statutes interpreted by Atkisson: the legislature repealed the Fair
Employment Practices Act and reenacted it as Government Code §§ 12900-
12996, as a part of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. Id.
Thus, the legislature failed to object to the Atkisson interpretation of the
term "marital status" because it did not amend the pertinent part of the statute
when it had an opportunity to do so. Id. Therefore, the Donahue court rea-
soned, the California Legislature acquiesced to the Atkisson reading of the
term. Id.
To further support its conclusion, the Donahue court pointed out that Gov-
ernment Code § 12955 prohibited marital status discrimination against any
"person" and noted that section 12925(d) of the Government Code defined the
term to include "one or more individuals." Id. Consequently, according to the
court, marital status includes two individuals living together, i.e. a cohabiting
couple. Id.
The court also argued that the legislative intent for Government Code
§ 12955 to protect unmarried couples was consistent with the absence of any
criminal sanctions for their cohabitation. Id. at 38. The court noted that Cali-
fornia used to have a statute prohibiting cohabitation of persons who were both
married to others. Id. The statute was repealed when the legislature added a
statutory prohibition against marital status discrimination. Id.
66. Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32, 38
(Ct. App. 1991), rev. granted and opinion superseded, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992),
rev. dismissed, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993).
67. Id.
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ception, the court deduced that the legislature intended that
no other exceptions to the statute could be implied. 68 Conse-
quently, according to the Donahue court, the legislature in-
tended the term "marital status" to include not only single
people but also couples, married and unmarried.69
2. State Constitutional Law
After the Donahue court discussed the scope of the term
"marital status" as used in Government Code section 12955,
it turned to the question of whether the landlords were enti-
tled to an exemption from the statute based on their religious
belief.70
The Donahue court observed a difference between the
California and the federal constitutional analyses.71 The
United States Supreme Court abandoned the Sherbert com-
pelling state interest test in its Peyote Case decision.72 Nev-
ertheless, according to Donahue, the compelling interest test
still applied in California state courts.73 The Donahue court
indicated that the state courts in California must follow the
pre-Peyote Case compelling interest test because the Califor-
nia Supreme Court had not yet addressed the United States
Supreme Court's Peyote Case decision.74
The compelling interest test, as propounded by the
United States Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner,75 re-
quires the court to balance the landlord's interest in the free
exercise of religion against the interest of the state.76 In or-
der to be exempt from the statute, the landlord must show a
sincere religious belief and a burden on that belief.77 The
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32, 39
(Ct. App. 1991), rev. granted and opinion superseded, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992),
rev. dismissed, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993).
72. See id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 40.
75. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
76. See id. at 403; see also supra note 31.
77. Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32, 42
(Ct. App. 1991), rev. granted and opinion superseded, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992),
rev. dismissed, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993). The Donahue court stated:
An analysis of the burden focuses on "the degree that the government's
requirement will, directly or indirectly, make the believer's religious
duties more difficult or more costly" (citation omitted). A conflict which
1995] 227
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court concluded that the government statute burdened the
landlord's sincere belief with personal, spiritual, and mone-
tary encumbrances.78
The Donahue court had to determine whether the gov-
ernment's interest outweighed the landlord's interest in the
free exercise of religion.79 The court stated that the govern-
ment must show more than the mere existence of the state
law and more than just a general interest in eradicating in-
vidious discrimination in order for the interest to be compel-
ling.8 0 The State should focus on the "particular nature of
the discrimination at issue" and on the rank of the state in-
terest among other state policies.8 ' The Donahue court
quoted several pre-Peyote Case United States Supreme Court
cases to illustrate its point that the state interest in prohibit-
ing discrimination against unmarried couples ranks rela-
tively low in the discrimination hierarchy.
8 2
The court stated that, in contexts other than housing,
California discriminated against unmarried couples by deny-
ing them rights enjoyed by married couples.8 3 The court,
however, admitted that "the law has acknowledged a societal
trend toward cohabitation without marriage." 4 Neverthe-
less, due to the existence of "a strong policy favoring mar-
threatens "the core values of a faith poses more serious free exercise
problems than does a conflict that merely inconveniences the faithful."
Id. (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-12 at
1246 (2d ed. 1988).
78. Id. at 42-43.
79. Id. at 44.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32, 42
(Ct. App. 1991), rev. granted and opinion superseded, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992),
rev. dismissed, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993). The Donahue court stated:
On one end of the hierarchy, for example, "the Government has a fun-
damental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in
education . . ." (citation omitted). Going down the hierarchy of the
state's interests.., the state's interest in compulsory education is not
compelling enough to restrict the Amish from their free exercise of reli-
gion (citation omitted). Going further down the hierarchy of the
state's interest, its interest in discouraging false unemployment com-
pensation claims by requiring citizens to work on Saturdays is not suf-
ficiently compelling to allow abridgment of the Sabbatarians' religious
prohibition against working on Saturdays.
Id. (alterations in original).
83. Id.
84. Id. (Grignon, J., dissenting) (citing Elden v. Sheldon, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254
(1988) and Marvin v. Marvin, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976)).
228 [Vol. 36
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riage," the court decided that the government lacked a com-
pelling interest in protecting unmarried couples. 85
C. Marital Status in California under California Case
Law
1. Atkisson v. Kern County Housing Authority
The term "marital status" lay at the core of the issue
presented in Smith.86 Although Atkisson v. Kern County
Housing Authority did not pertain to private landlords, it il-
lustrates the state's policy regarding marital status.8 7
In Atkisson, the plaintiff cohabited 8 with a man while
living with her children in low income housing operated by
the Kern County Housing Authority [hereinafter KCHA]. 8 9
The KCHA's statement of policies forbade "any and all low
income public housing tenants from living with anyone of the
opposite sex to whom the tenant [was] not related by blood,
marriage, or adoption."90 When the KCHA found that Atkis-
85. Id. The court stated that discrimination by landlords due to religious
belief does not deny all housing to the cohabiting couples. Id. at 45. The court
explained that the state has no interest in providing a particular unit to the
prospective tenants as opposed to another, if both are "decent and not unsani-
tary, unsafe, overcrowded or congested." Id. (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 50001(a) & (b)).
86. See supra text accompanying note 28.
87. 130 Cal. Rptr. 375 (Ct. App. 1976).
88. Cohabitation is defined: "To live together as husband and wife. The mu-
tual assumption of those marital rights, duties and obligations which are usu-
ally manifested by married people, including but not necessarily dependent on
sexual relations." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 178 (6th ed. 1991).
89. Atkisson, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 377-78. Atkisson's lease stated that it was
"subject to the . . . eligibility requirements ... and the regulations of the Au-
thority... of its lawfully constituted powers and duties." Id. at 377. The lease
also stated that only those listed on the lease application may live in the unit.
Id.
90. Id. at 377. The Kern County Housing Authority based the policy on the
view that:
(a) such cohabitation is immoral;
(b) that such cohabitation results in a continuous turnover of co-
habitants which results in management problems such as computation
of rents;
(c)... that (1) a cohabitant tenant is or becomes less responsible to
[the Housing Authority], and (2) is a poor influence on the cohabitant
tenants as families; and
(d) ... that unless cohabitation is prohibited, there will be (1) a
demoralizing effect on tenancy relations, and (2) the number of cohabi-
tants could not be controlled.
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son was living with a man not related to her, it attempted to
evict her.91
The California court of appeal ruled that the KCHA's pol-
icy was unlawful because it violated the regulations of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development [hereinafter
HUD]. 92 The HUD regulations prohibited an automatic ex-
clusion of a particular class of people, defined by marital sta-
tus.93 The court stated: "In contravention of such authority
... policy [of the KCHA] automatically excludes all unmar-
ried cohabiting adults; a class of persons defined by their
marital status."94 Thus, the court applied the term "marital
status" to unmarried couples.96
In addition, the court stated that California Health and
Safety Code section 35720 expressed the State's policy relat-
ing to public housing.9 s The statute provided that it shall be
unlawful:
1. For the owner of any publicly assisted housing accom-
modation which is in, or to be used for a multiple dwell-
ing, with knowledge of such assistance, to refuse to ...
rent or lease or otherwise to deny to or withhold from any
91. Id. at 378. At a grievance hearing it was found that Atkisson violated
her lease agreement. Id. When plaintiff filed a complaint with the Superior
Court for a declaratory and injunctive relief, the court denied it. Id.
92. Id. at 379. On December 17, 1968, HUD issued a circular entitled
"Standards for Establishment and Administration of Admission and Occupancy
Regulations." Id. The circular provided the following in the pertinent parts:
b. A Local Authority shall not establish policies which automati-
cally deny admission or continued occupancy to a particular class, such
as unmarried mothers, families having one or more children out of
wedlock, families having police records or poor rent-paying habits, etc.
c. To determine whether applicants or occupants should be admit-
ted to or remain in its project, a Local Authority may establish criteria
and standards bearing on whether the conduct of such tenants ... does
or would be likely to interfere with other tenants in such a manner as
to materially diminish their enjoyment of the premises. Such interfer-
ence must relate to the actual or threatened conduct of the tenant and
not be based solely on such matters as the marital status of the family,
the legitimacy of the children in the family, police records, etc.
Id. at 379. The court stated that the circular issued by HUD was binding on
local housing authorities because it was written in mandatory language. Id.
93. Id.
94. Atkisson v. Kern County Hous. Auth., 130 Cal. Rptr. 375, 379 (Ct. App.
1976).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 381. The statute was amended to include the term "marital sta-
tus" after the case had reached the court. Therefore, since it could not have
been directly applied to Atkisson, it was used only as a statement of state policy.
Id.
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person or group of persons such housing accommodation
because of the ... marital status . . . of such person or
persons.
8. For any owner of housing accommodations to harass,
evict, or otherwise discriminate against any person in the
... rental of housing accommodations when his dominant
purpose is retaliation against a person who has opposed
practices unlawful under this section .... 97
According to the Atkisson court, the statute applied to un-
married couples as well as to married ones.98
2. Hess v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission
In Hess v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission, the
California appellate court interpreted the term "marital sta-
tus" once more. 99 Hess concerned private rather than public
landlords and, unlike Smith, the landlords in Hess did not
claim freedom of religion as a defense.100
The petitioners, Victor and Helen Hess, owned a duplex
which they initially agreed to rent to John Pryor and Debbie
Rogers.101 However, when the landlords learned that Pryor
and Rogers were not married, they refused to rent to the
couple.102 The refusal resulted from the Hess' practice of ap-
plying different financial criteria to rental applications sub-
mitted by married and unmarried couples. 10 3 The landlords
required only one spouse of a married couple to qualify,
whereas unmarried people had to qualify individually. 10 4
97. Id. (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 35720). Section 35720, to-
gether with §§ 35700-35745, was repealed in 1980. Hess v. Fair Employment &
Hous. Comm'n, 187 Cal. Rptr. 712, 713-14 (Ct. App. 1982). The same year, the
legislature repealed the Fair Employment Practices Act, Labor Code §§ 1410-
1433, and reenacted it as Government Code §§ 12900-12996, as part of the Cal-
ifornia Fair Employment and Housing Act [hereinafter FEHA]. Id. Therefore,
the subject of housing discrimination, whether in public or private housing, is
now covered by the FEHA. Id. at 714 n.2.
98. Id.
99. Atkisson v. Kern County Hous. Auth., 130 Cal. Rptr. 375, 379 (Ct. App.
1976).
100. Id. at 714.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Hess v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 187 Cal. Rptr. 712, 714-15
(Ct. App. 1982).
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Rogers' pregnancy and the fact that she would not work after
the birth made her unqualified to become the Hess' tenant. 0
The appellate court examined the Fair Employment and
Housing Act [hereinafter FEHA], including Government
Code section 12955(a). 10 6 Relying on Atkisson, the appellate
court stated that the FEHA "prohibits discrimination based
on marital status, including that against unmarried
couples." 10 7 As a result, the court of appeal ruled for the
prospective tenants, holding that the landlords unlawfully
discriminated against the couple based on their marital
status. '
0 8
D. Other Jurisdictions
As indicated above, 10 9 the review of Smith by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court presents a case of first impression.1 °
Since no California precedent exists, when a landlord claims
a religious exercise exception from a state statute prohibiting
marital status discrimination, decisions from other jurisdic-
tions should be consulted for guidance."' Three state
supreme courts have recently dealt with similar issues: Min-
nesota,112 Massachusetts, 1 13 and Alaska. 114 Each jurisdic-
tion reached a different result.
105. Id. Consequently, Pryor and Rogers filed a complaint with the FEHC,
alleging marital status discrimination. Id. The landlords petitioned the San
Mateo Superior Court for a writ of administrative mandamus to compel the
commission to set aside its decision. Id. When the petition was denied, the
landlords appealed. Id.
106. The FEHA was codified in Government Code §§ 12900-12996. Id. at
714 n.4.
107. Id. at 714. As no California law specifically addressed the issue raised
by the landlords, the court also looked to the federal Equal Credit Opportunity
Act, which contained a provision "substantively equivalent" to Government
Code section 12955. Id.
The court also decided that the landlords did not have any legitimate busi-
ness interest to justify their practice because "a landlord can require each ten-
ant to be personally liable for the amount of the rent. Such a practice gives a
landlord a contractual cause of action against each tenant, whether married or
not." Id. at 715.
108. Id. at 715.
109. See supra part I.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 4-5.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 13-15.
112. State ex rel. Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990).
113. Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994).
114. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska
1994).
[Vol. 36
1995] NO SINNERS 233
1. Minnesota
The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled for the landlord in
State ex rel. Cooper v. French."5 Landlord Layle French re-
fused to rent a two-bedroom house to Susan Parsons. 1 16 The
landlord "decided that Parsons had a romantic relationship
with her fiancd, Wesley Jenson, and that the two would likely
engage in sexual relations outside of marriage on the subject
property."117 According to the landlord's religious beliefs,
such conduct was sinful.118
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the landlord did
not violate the Minnesota Human Rights Act's [hereinafter
MHRA] prohibition of marital status discrimination.11 9 It
also held that the landlord's right to the free exercise of his
religion outweighed the prospective tenant's interest in
cohabiting. 120
a. Marital Status
Even though the MHRA used the term "marital status,"
it had not defined it at the time Parson's action was initi-
ated. 121 Therefore, the Minnesota Supreme Court first had to
interpret the meaning of the phrase. 122 The past decisions of
the court indicated that "[tihis court, in construing the term
'marital status' has consistently looked to the legislature's
115. 460 N.W.2d 2, 11 (Minn. 1990).
116. The house was previously occupied by the landlord, and he was renting
it out while attempting to sell it. Id. at 3. French agreed to rent the place to
Parsons at first, but after two days changed his mind. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 3-4. As a result of the landlord's refusal to rent, Parsons brought
a charge against French with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights, al-
leging marital status discrimination in violation of the Minnesota Human
Rights Act, MINN. STAT. § 363.03 (1986) [hereinafter MHRAI. Id. at 4. The
MHRA provided: "It is an unfair discriminatory practice: (1) For an owner,
lessee ... (a) to refuse to ... rent or lease ... any real property because of...
marital status .... " MINN. STAT. § 363.03(2) (1986).
The administrative law judge ruled that the landlord violated the statute.
Cooper, 460 N.W.2d at 4. The court of appeal confirmed the lower court's deci-
sion. Id. It also ruled that free exercise of religion did not constitute a defense
against the charge of marital status discrimination. Id. The landlord appealed
to the Minnesota Supreme Court. Id.
119. Cooper, 460 N.W.2d at 11.
120. State ex rel. Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 8 (Minn. 1990).
121. Id. at 4.
122. Id. at 4-5. The court stated: "The term 'marital status' is ambiguous
because it is susceptible to more than one meaning, namely, a meaning which
includes cohabiting couples and one which does not." Id. at 5.
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policy of discouraging the practice of fornication 123 and pro-
tecting the institution of marriage." 124 According to the
court, the state's pro-marriage policy was expressed by a stat-
ute that made it criminal to fornicate.
125
The court not only looked to cases interpreting the
MHRA, but also pointed out that even after the MHRA was
amended in 1988, it was not intended to protect "an individ-
ual's relationship with a spouse, fianc6, fianc6e, or other do-
mestic partner."126 Rather, the statute protected "only the
status of an individual." 127 Therefore, according to the Min-
nesota Supreme Court, the MHRA did not protect cohabiting
couples from marital discrimination either before or after the
amendment. 
28
The court stressed the importance of the anti-fornication
statute in interpreting the term "marital status" in the
MHRA. 1 29 The court indicated that courts in other jurisdic-
tions also looked to similar statutes for guidance. 130 For ex-
ample, the court stated that "the Alaska Supreme Court, in
ascertaining its legislature's intent as to the meaning of 'mar-
ital status,' relied entirely on the fact that Alaska's fornica-
tion statute had been repealed eleven years earlier in con-
cluding that protection for unmarried cohabiting couples was
included." 13 ' Thus, as interpreted by the Minnesota Supreme
123. Fornication is defined as follows:
Sexual intercourse other than between married persons. Further, if
one of the persons be married and the other not, it is fornication on the
part of the latter, though adultery for the former. In some jurisdiction,
however, by statute, it is adultery on the part of both persons if the
woman is married, whether the man is married or not. The offense,
which is variously defined by state statutes, is very seldom enforced.
BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 451 (6th ed. 1991).
124. Cooper, 460 N.W.2d at 5.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 6.
127. Id. The court stated: "the legislature did not intend to expand the defi-
nition of 'marital status' in order to penalize landlords for refusing to rent to
unmarried, cohabiting couples." Id. The court, citing amended Minnesota Stat-
ute § 363.01, subd. 40, defined marital status in the following way: "'Marital
status' means whether a person is single, married, remarried, divorced, sepa-
rated, or a surviving spouse and, in employment cases, includes protection
against discrimination on the basis of the identity, situation, actions, or beliefs
of a spouse or former spouse." Id. (emphasis omitted).
128. Id. at 5.
129. State ex rel. Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 5 (Minn. 1990).
130. Id.
131. Id. (citing Foreman v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 779 P.2d 1199
(Alaska 1985)). In addition to the above, the court responded to the argument
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Court, the term "marital status" did not include unmarried
couples. 132
b. State Constitutional Law
After having established the scope of the phrase "marital
status" in the light of state public policy, legislative intent,
and its own prior decisions, the Minnesota Supreme Court
proceeded to the constitutional issue of protection of religious
liberty.13 3 The court decided that the case should be analyzed
under the Minnesota Constitution due to then recent "unfore-
seeable changes" in the United States Constitution's First
Amendment law.13 4  The Minnesota Constitution provided
more protection of religious freedom than the Federal Consti-
tution.135 The Minnesota Constitution demanded that the
court "weigh the competing interests at stake whenever
rights of conscience are burdened." 3 6 Thus, the court rea-
soned, "French must be granted an exemption from MHRA
unless the state can demonstrate a compelling and overriding
state interest, not only in the state's general statutory pur-
pose, but in refusing to grant an exemption to French. " 1
37
The court concluded that the state did not meet its bur-
den.138 In support of its holding, the court showed, first, that
there were many other contexts where cohabiting couples
that French, having entered the public marketplace, gave up his constitutional
rights. Id. at 7-8. The court distinguished "doing business for profit in the cor-
porate form from denying Minnesota residents the basic right to earn a living."
Id. at 8. The court stated that the landlord did not forfeit his constitutional
rights by engaging in renting "his former residence while it was for sale in a
depressed real estate market" since he did that due to "economic necessity." Id.
132. Id. at 5.
133. Id. at 8.
134. State ex rel. Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 8 (Minn. 1990). The
Supreme Court of the United States had just decided the Peyote Case. See
supra note 31.
135. Cooper, 460 N.W.2d at 9. The Minnesota Constitution provides:
The right of every man to worship God according to the dictates of his
own conscience shall never be infringed... nor shall any control of or
interference with the rights of conscience be permitted, or any prefer-
ence be give by law to any religious establishment or mode of worship;
but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed
as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with
the peace or safety of the state ....
MINN. CONST., art. I, § 16.
136. Cooper, 460 N.W.2d at 9.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 10.
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were not legally entitled to the same treatment as married
couples.13 9 Second, the state could not have a compelling in-
terest in fornication because a state statute already prohib-
ited it. 140 Finally, the state should not be able to force a per-
son to break one statute in order to obey another. 14 1 Since
the state failed to show an interest overriding the landlord's
interest in the free exercise of religion, and since the state
also had a "paramount need under [the state] constitution to
protect religious freedom," the court ruled that the landlord
was entitled to a religious freedom exemption from the anti-
discrimination statute.
142
2. Massachusetts
Massachusetts, in Attorney General v. Desilets, consid-
ered the case of a landlord who refused to rent to an unmar-
ried couple because of the landlord's religious beliefs.143 In
Desilets, the landlords were two brothers who owned a four-
unit apartment house in Montague, Massachusetts.1 44 They
refused to lease an apartment to Mark Lattanzi and Cynthia
Tarail, who were unmarried. 145 The landlords' action was
motivated by their religious belief that "they should not facili-
tate sinful conduct, including fornication."' 46
a. Marital Status
At that time, Massachusetts General Laws provided that
"it shall be an unlawful practice for the owner of a multiple
dwelling 'to refuse to rent or lease.., or otherwise to deny to
or withhold from any person or group of persons such accom-
modations because of the... marital status of such person or
139. Id. Such contexts include: employee life and health benefits, intestate
succession, and the rules of evidence regarding the privilege for marital commu-
nication. Id.
140. Id. at 10.
141. State ex rel. Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 11 (Minn. 1990). The
court stated that the statutes can be easily reconciled: "[If the state has a duty
to enforce a statute in the least restrictive way to accommodate religious be-
liefs, surely it is less restrictive to require Parsons to abide by the law prohibit-
ing fornication than to compel French to cooperate in breaking it." Id. at 10.
142. Id. at 11.
143. 636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994).
144. Id. at 234.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 235.
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persons.' "147 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
concluded that the landlords violated the statute. 14  Accord-
ing to the court, the landlords discriminated on the basis of
marital status.149 The court held that the statute protected
married as well as unmarried cohabiting couples.15 0
b. State Constitutional Law
Since the statute protected unmarried couples, the main
issue before the court was whether "enforcement of the stat-
ute against [the landlords] violate[d] their rights [to the free
exercise of religious belief] under the State and Federal Con-
stitutions. "1 51 The court decided that even though the state
and federal constitutional amendments were similar, 1 2 the
court should apply only the State Constitution. 153 Under the
pre-Peyote Case compelling interest test of the Massachusetts
Constitution, in order to be exempt from the statute, the
landlords had to show a sincerely held religious belief, a con-
flict of that belief with the state statute, and a burden which
the statute imposed on the belief.' 51 The State, on the other
hand, would prevail if it showed that it had an unusually im-
portant goal and that an exemption would substantially hin-
der the fulfillment of that goal.' 55
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court noted that
the landlords' religious belief was sincere and that the land-
147. Id. (quoting MAsS. GEN. L. ch. 151B, § 4(6) (1988)) (emphasis omitted).
148. Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 234 (Mass. 1994).
149. Id. at 235.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. Article 46, § 1 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitu-
tion provides: "No law shall be passed prohibiting the free exercise of religion."
MASS. CONST. art. 46, § 1.
153. Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 234 (Mass. 1994). The court
stated:
In interpreting art. 46, § 1, we prefer to adhere to the standards of
earlier First Amendment jurisprudence, such as we applied [in numer-
ous previous cases]. In each opinion, we used the balancing test that
the Supreme Court had established under the free exercise of religion
clause in Wisconsin v. Yoder, Sherbert v. Verner, and subsequent opin-
ions. By applying the balancing test as we do, we extend protections to
the defendants that are at least as great as those of the First Amend-
ment. No further discussion of the First Amendment is, therefore,
necessary.
Id. (citations omitted).
154. Id. at 236-37.
155. Id. at 237.
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lords' constitutional right to free exercise of religion was sub-
stantially burdened by the statute. 156 The court reasoned
that the statute made the exercise of religion more difficult
and more costly. 157 The court acknowledged that the land-
lords' participation in a commercial enterprise may be rele-
vant, but it refused to consider the issue at such an early
stage.158 The court stated that the commercial context would
be relevant at the final stage of the analysis, when the inter-
ests of both sides were being balanced.
59
The court indicated that the government interest, in or-
der to be compelling, must not be just a general interest in
eliminating discrimination of all kinds.160 Rather, the gov-
ernment should show a compelling interest specifically
directed at eliminating discrimination against unmarried
couples in housing.
161
The court pointed out that the Massachusetts Constitu-
tion banned discrimination based on sex, race, color, creed or
national origin, but not marital status. 6 2 Therefore, the
court reasoned, the State's concern regarding discrimination
based on marital status was not as substantial as its concern
regarding discrimination based on the other enumerated
factors. 163
In addition, the court indicated that there were numer-
ous state statutes and cases which gave married couples
rights not given to unmarried couples. 164 The presence of a
Massachusetts anti-fornication statute was relevant to the is-
sue of state's interest, as well.' 65 Even though the statute
156. Id.
157. Id. The court stated: "The statute affirmatively obliges the defendants
to enter into a contract contrary to their religious beliefs and provides signifi-
cant sanctions for its violation." Id.
158. Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 234 (Mass. 1994).
159. Id. at 238.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 239. The court stated: "Article 1 of the Massachusetts Declara-
tion of Rights, as amended by art[icle) 106, of the Amendments to the Massa-
chusetts Constitution, states that '[e]quality under the law shall not be denied
or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed or national origin.'" Id.
163. Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 239 (Mass. 1994).
164. Id. at 240 (Mass. 1994). Such statutes could be found in the following
areas of the law: workers' compensation, health insurance, life insurance, dispo-
sition of property by will, right to bring a wrongful death action, and marital
communication privilege. Id. at 239-40 nn.10-11.
165. Id. at 240.
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was of "doubtful constitutionality," the fact that it still re-
mained on the books suggested, according to the court, "some
diminution in the strength of the Commonwealth's interest in
the elimination of housing discrimination based on marital
status." 16
6
In the end, the Desilets court was not able to decide
whether the state had a sufficiently compelling interest in
eliminating discrimination based on marital status.167 The
court stated that it needed more facts regarding the issue and
remanded the case. 168
3. Alaska
In Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, the
Alaska Supreme Court tackled the problem of a religious ex-
ercise exemption for a landlord who refused to rent to an un-
married couple.' 6 9 The landlord, on three different occasions,
refused to rent or even allow inspection to potential tenants
because they intended to live with a member of the opposite
sex to whom they were not married.1 70 The court held that
Swanner discriminated against the potential tenants based
on their marital status. 71 It further held that the fair hous-
ing laws did not deprive the landlord of his right to the free
exercise of religion. 1
72
a. Marital Status
Two Alaska statutes were relevant to the landlord's con-
duct: Alaska Statute 18.80.240 and Anchorage Municipal
Code 5.20.020. Alaska Statute 18.80.240 provides in perti-
nent part that it is unlawful:
(1) to refuse to... lease, or rent the real property to a
person because of... marital status, [or] changes in mari-
tal status...
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 241 (Mass. 1994). The court
needed more facts regarding legislative findings as to the state's interest, num-
bers of rental units withheld because of religious beliefs, and availability of
rental housing to unmarried couples in that particular area, among others. Id.
at 240-41.
169. 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994).
170. Id. at 276-77.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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(3) to make a written or oral inquiry or record of the
... marital status, [or] changes in marital status.., of a
person seeking to ... lease or rent real property...
(5) to represent to a person that real property is not
available for inspection ... rental, or lease when in fact it
is so available, or to refuse to allow a person to inspect
real property because of the . . . marital status, [or]
change in marital status ... of that person . . . 173
Anchorage Municipal Code 5.20.020 provides in pertinent
part:
Except in the individual home wherein the renter or
lessee would share common living areas with the owner,
lessor, manager, agent or other person, it is unlawful...
A. To refuse to... rent property to a person because
of... marital status ...
C. To make a written or oral inquiry or record of the
•.. marital status.., of a person seeking to... rent real
property;
E. To represent to a person that real property is not
available for inspection... [or] rental.., when in fact it is
available, or to refuse a person the right to inspect real
property, because of the . . . marital status . . . of that
174person ....
The Alaska Supreme Court decided that the case in-
volved marital status discrimination because the landlord
would have rented to the tenants had they been married.
175
The landlord thus violated both statutes.
176
b. Federal Constitutional Law
The court also held that the landlord was not entitled to
a constitutional exemption from the statutes because of his
religious belief.177 The court decided that enforcement of the
anti-discrimination statutes did not violate the landlord's
constitutional right to the free exercise of his religion under
173. Id. at 278 n.2.
174. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 278 n.3
(Alaska 1994).
175. Id. at 278.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 279.
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the United States Constitution.17  The court based its rea-
soning on the test applied in the Peyote Case.179
The Peyote Court stated that "a law that is neutral and of
general applicability need not be justified by a compelling
governmental interest even if the law has the incidental ef-
fect of burdening a particular religious practice." 8 0 The laws
in Swanner were neutral on their face because "[n]either the
ordinance nor the statute contain[ed] any language singling
out any religious group or practice."' 8 ' The laws were gener-
ally applicable because they applied to all people renting or
selling property.'8 2 As a result, the court concluded that "at
least under the general rule, no compelling state interest is
necessary."8
3
c. State Constitutional Law
In addition, according to the Alaska Supreme Court, the
enforcement of the statutes did not violate the landlord's con-
stitutional right to the free exercise of religion under the
Alaska Constitution.18 4 The court decided that the govern-
ment interest in abolishing improper discrimination in hous-
ing outweighed the landlord's interest in acting based on his
religious beliefs.' 8 5 The court considered the following three
factors which invoke a religious exemption: (1) whether reli-
gion was involved at all; (2) whether the conduct at issue was
religiously based; and (3) whether the religious belief was sin-
cere.' 8 6 The court concluded that all three requirements
were satisfied.18
7
178. Id. at 280.
179. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 280
(Alaska 1994).
180. Id. at 279 (alteration in original).
181. Id. at 280.
182. Id.
183. Id. The court mentioned that the Peyote Case allows an exemption
when a hybrid situation occurs. Id. However, such was not the case in Swan-
ner, so the exemption did not apply. Id.
184. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 280 n.3
(Alaska 1994).
185. Id. at 284.
186. The court used the test it applied in Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068
(Alaska 1979), adopted from Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Swanner,
874 P.2d at 281.
187. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 282.
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The court then discussed the conditions which might for-
bid granting a religious exemption.'18 The conditions were
first, either the religiously impelled action constituted a sub-
stantial threat to public safety, peace, or order, or second,
there existed a compelling government interest of the highest
order.189 Since the first condition did not apply to the situa-
tion before the Alaska Supreme Court, the second was
scrutinized. 190
The majority stated that the government may have two
interests: "a 'derivative' interest in ensuring access to hous-
ing for everyone, and a 'transactional' interest in preventing
individual acts of discrimination based on irrelevant charac-
teristics."' 9' The majority stressed the government's strong
transactional interest. 92 It stated: "The government views
acts of discrimination as independent social evils even if the
prospective tenants ultimately find housing. Allowing hous-
ing discrimination that degrades individuals, affronts human
dignity, and limits one's opportunities results in harming the
government's transactional interest in preventing such
discrimination."19
3
The court rejected the dissent's argument that preven-
tion of marital status discrimination was not of the highest
order because the State itself treated unmarried and married
couples differently on many occasions.19 4 The court pointed
out that those other state policies were irrelevant to the case
before it because "[tihe government's interest here [was] in
specifically eliminating marital status discrimination in
housing, rather than eliminating marital status discrimina-
tion in general."195
188. Id.
189. Id. at 282.
190. Id.
191. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 282
(Alaska 1994). The court explained that a derivative interest means objection
to the effect of an action, whereas a transactional interest means objection to
the activity itself. Id.
192. Id. at 282-83.
193. Id. at 283.
194. Id.
195. Id. The court stated:
[T]reating married couples differently from unmarried couples is argu-
able necessary to avoid fraudulent availment of benefits available only
to spouses. The difficulty of discerning whose bonds are genuine and
whose are not may justify requiring official certification of the bonds
242 [Vol. 36
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As to the burden that the statutes imposed on the land-
lord's exercise of religion, the court noted that if there indeed
existed a burden, it fell on the landlord's conduct and not on
his beliefs.196 The court underscored the importance of dis-
tinguishing between religious observance and commercial ac-
tivity.197 The court quoted the United States Supreme Court,
explaining that when religious people start engaging in busi-
ness, they may not impose on the laws and regulations the
same limits which they impose on their consciences. 19  The
court concluded that the landlord may not be granted an ex-
emption from the statutes because his "religiously impelled
actions trespass on the private right not be unfairly discrimi-
nated against in housing."199
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
The California Supreme Court must decide whether
landlords who, on the basis of their religious beliefs, refuse to
rent to unmarried couples should be exempt from a state stat-
ute that prohibits marital status discrimination. Several
problems arise in connection with this issue: first, whether
the term "marital status" indeed applies to unmarried
couples; 200 and second, what test under the California Consti-
tution should be applied to determine whether the court
should grant the landlords an exemption from a state stat-
ute.20 1 Additionally, the constitutional problem gives rise to
yet another point of concern: how to correctly balance inter-
ests of the landlord and of the state.20 2 The respective inter-
ests of the parties must be accurately balanced regardless of
via a marriage document. That problem is not present in housing
cases ....
Id.
196. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 283
(Alaska 1994).
197. Id.
198. Id. (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982)). In addi-
tion, the Swanner court argued: "Swanner has made no showing of a religious
belief which requires that he engage in the property-rental business. Addition-
ally, the economic burden ... is caused by his choice to enter into a commercial
activity that is regulated by anti-discrimination laws." Id. at 283.
199. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 284
(Alaska 1994).
200. See infra part V.A.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18; see also infra part IV.B.1.
202. Compare infra part II.D.l.b and part II.D.2.b with part II.D.3.c; see also
infra part 1V.B.2.
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whether the compelling state interest test or the incidental
effect test is used.
If Government Code section 12955 does not protect un-
married couples from marital status discrimination, then
landlords will be free to refuse to rent to couples if, for any
reason, the landlords disapprove of their not being mar-
ried.2 °3 Landlords would not need to claim the right to reli-
gious freedom of exercise or any other constitutional protec-
tion to be exempt from the statute. Therefore, it is necessary
to examine how the court ought to interpret the term "marital
status."
The constitutional test referred to in the second sub-is-
sue determines the level of interests that the state and the
landlord must prove.2 °4 If the court chooses to utilize the pre-
Peyote Case compelling interest standard, then the State will
face a more challenging task than if the incidental effect test
is used: to outweigh the landlord's interest, the State will
have to carry a much higher evidentiary burden.20 5
Finally, determining how to correctly balance the inter-
ests of the landlord and the state is significant, since the level
of state interest may vary depending on the court's focus.
The state interest may reach a different level depending on
whether it is an interest in eradicating discrimination in gen-
eral, discrimination against unmarried couples in all areas of
the law, or discrimination against unmarried couples specifi-
cally in housing.
IV. ANALYSIS
As demonstrated in the background section of this com-
ment, the facts in all five cases206 were alike: the landlords
refused to rent to unmarried couples because they believed
that non-marital sex was sinful.207 The landlords were con-
203. See supra part II.C.2.
204. See infra part 1V.B.1.
205. See infra part IV.B.1.
206. Compare Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274
(Alaska 1994); Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d
395 (Ct. App.), rev. granted and opinion superseded, 880 P.2d 111 (Cal. 1994);
Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (Ct. App.
1991), rev. granted and opinion superseded, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992), rev. dis-
missed, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233
(Mass. 1994); State ex rel. Cooper v. French, 460 N.W. 2d 2 (Minn. 1990). See
supra part II.
207. See supra part II.
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vinced that they would be sinning themselves if they rented
to people who lived in sin.20  None of the cases questioned
the sincerity of the owners' religious belief.20 9 Also, in all
four jurisdictions, state statutes prohibited marital status
discrimination.2 10 The issues were also phrased similarly.2 11
The cases, however, differed in their outcomes. French
decided that the Minnesota statute prohibiting marital status
discrimination did not apply to unmarried couples.2 12 Even
though further analysis was redundant after such a conclu-
sion, the court granted the landlord an exemption from the
statute.21 3
The Massachusetts court, in Desilets, on the other hand,
did apply the state statute to unmarried couples.214 How-
ever, the court did not resolve the constitutional issue be-
cause it was unable to determine just how compelling the
state's interest was.215
Finally, Alaska, too, decided that the statute prohibiting
marital discrimination applied to unmarried couples.2 16 The
court held that the statute did not violate the landlord's right
to the free exercise of religion under either the Federal or
Alaska Constitution.217
A. Marital Status
In order to determine whether a landlord in California
should be allowed to discriminate against unmarried couples
based on the landlord's religious convictions, it is essential to
establish first whether the term "marital status" applies to
208. See supra text accompanying notes 19-24, 53-57, 99-105.
209. See Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 237 (Mass. 1994); Swan-
ner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 281-82 (Alaska 1994).
The Cooper court implicitly assumed the landlord's sincerity of belief. See also
State ex rel. Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 10 (Minn. 1990).
210. See supra text accompanying notes 26, 147, 173-74; see also supra note
118.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 28, 112-14.
212. See supra text accompanying note 119.
213. See supra text accompanying note 120; see also supra part II.D.l.a. The
court weighed the landlord's interest in the freedom of religion against the
state's "interest in promoting fornication" and ruled that the state interest was
not overriding. State ex rel. Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 10-11 (Minn.
1990).
214. See supra text accompanying note 150.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 167-68.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 175-76.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 177-78, 184.
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unmarried couples. It was the absence of marriage that
prompted the landlords to refuse housing to the couples.21
The landlords clearly stated that they would have rented to
the couples had they been married.219
California courts have found marital status to encompass
unwed mothers, single, divorced, and widowed persons.22 °
They have also construed the term, in conjunction with other
statutory provisions, to include couples as well.22 1 Since the
presence or absence of marriage in the context of individuals
constitutes marital status, it should follow that the presence
or absence of marriage in the context of couples likewise con-
stitutes marital status. Therefore, if a couple is refused hous-
ing solely because they are unmarried, then such refusal
equals discrimination on the basis of marital status.
The California cases Atkisson and Hess, the rules of stat-
utory interpretation, and decisions from other jurisdictions
provide the foundation for including unmarried couples in the
category of marital status. Both Atkisson and Hess applied
the term "marital status" to unmarried couples, the former in
the public housing sector, the latter in private housing.222
Both also agreed that treating tenants differently because of
their marital status constituted prohibited discrimination.2 23
After the Atkisson court had interpreted the term "mari-
tal status," the California Legislature made some changes in
the laws pertaining to housing.224 However, it left intact the
statutes pertaining to discrimination in housing, which were
addressed in Atkisson.225 Even though the meaning of the
218. See supra text accompanying notes 20, 56, 117, 145, 170.
219. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 276-77
(Alaska 1994); Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d
395, 396 (Ct. App.), rev. granted and opinion superseded, 880 P.2d 111 (Cal.
1994); Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32, 33
(Ct. App. 1991), rev. granted and opinion superseded, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992),
rev. dismissed, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d
233, 234 (Mass. 1994); State ex rel. Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 3 (Minn.
1990).
220. See Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395,
405 (Ct. App.), rev. granted and opinion superseded, 880 P.2d 111 (Cal. 1994);
see also supra note 59.
221. Hess v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 187 Cal. Rptr. 712, 715 (Ct.
App. 1982); see also supra note 65.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95, 107-08.
223. See supra part II.C.
224. See supra note 65.
225. See supra note 65.
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term "marital status" was not the main subject of the courts'
rulings, it was indispensable to deciding the main issues in
Atkisson and Hess.226 Therefore, the courts' interpretation of
the term carries sufficient weight for other courts to follow.
Generally, the legislature is aware of court decisions
which affect statutory law.227 The legislature could have re-
sponded to the Atkisson ruling with an amendment to the
statute when it discussed the general topic of housing. If pro-
tection of unmarried couples against marital status discrimi-
nation in housing was inconsistent with state policy, the leg-
islature could have taken the opportunity to react. On the
contrary, the California legislative body decided not to ad-
dress the meaning of the term "marital status discrimina-
tion."228 Therefore, it is safe to assume that such failure to
act was equivalent to acquiescence, and that the legislature
agreed with Atkisson's application of the term "marital sta-
tus" to unmarried couples.
Court decisions from other jurisdictions confirm the
above interpretation of marital status.229 Both the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Desilets, and the Alaska
Supreme Court in Swanner, support the position that prohi-
bition against marital status discrimination applies to un-
married as well as married couples.2 0 They both contended
that a refusal to rent was the equivalent of marital status
discrimination, when that refusal was based on the lack of
marriage between a cohabiting couple.2 3'
The courts from the other jurisdictions, in deciding the
issue of marital status, paid close attention to the presence or
absence of a state anti-fornication statute.23 2 Such statutes,
even if abandoned for many years, constitute at least a token
disapproval of non-marital cohabitation by the state.233 On
the other hand, the absence of criminal penalties for cohabi-
tation clears the way for finding that the state does not have
an interest in preventing the cohabitation of unmarried
226. See supra part 1I.C.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 61-64.
228. See supra note 65.
229. See supra part II.D.
230. See supra parts II.D.2.a., U.D.3.a.
231. See supra parts II.D.2.a., II.D.3.a.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 129-31, 165-66.
233. See supra text accompanying note 166.
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couples.2 3 4 Therefore, the fact that California does not pun-
ish non-marital sexual relationships is strong support for ap-
plying the term "marital status" to unmarried couples.
B. Constitutional Law
All three jurisdictions - Minnesota, Massachusetts, and
Alaska - agree that states do not need to follow the analysis
the United States Supreme Court applied in cases interpret-
ing the Federal Constitution.23 5 These jurisdictions also
agreed that under their respective state constitutions, the
State must prove the existence of a compelling interest in or-
der to override the landlord's interest in the freedom of the
exercise of religion.
2 3 6
1. Compelling State Interest
In order to decide whether California has a compelling
interest in protecting unmarried couples from marital status
discrimination, several questions must be answered.237
First, how is it significant that unmarried couples are not
protected by the legislature to the same extent as married
couples? 238 The California appellate courts and the Supreme
Courts of Minnesota and Massachusetts focused on the policy
of the state towards unmarried couples, in general, and on
the privileged position of married couples which pervades
state law, in particular.2 39 Alaska, however, was the only ju-
risdiction that asked the crucial question: what is the pur-
pose of a state's differentiating between married and unmar-
ried couples? The Swanner court found that the requirement
of marriage is the most convenient way of ascertaining that
the bonds between a couple are genuine.2 4 °
The existence of genuine bonds helps to distinguish be-
tween benefits like the right to spousal support, and the right
234. See supra note 65; see also Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights
Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 281 n.10 (Alaska 1994).
235. See supra text accompanying notes 134, 152, 184.
236. See supra parts II.D.l.b., II.D.2.b., II.D.3.c.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18. But see also text accompany-
ing notes 89-96.
238. See supra note 45.
239. See supra parts II.A., II.B., II.D.1., ILD.2.
240. See supra note 195. The proof of marriage is not a perfect test to evalu-
ate the quality of the bonds. However, it appears to be simpler, less costly,
more efficient and reliable, and less susceptible to fraud than having the couple
prove their bonds otherwise.
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to bring a wrongful death action or a negligent infliction of
emotional distress action on the one hand, and the right to
live together in a rented apartment on the other.241 Access to
housing does not constitute a privilege available only to those
whose bonds are genuine, whereas the benefits enumerated
above do. For example, if an unmarried man and woman, not
romantically involved, wished to rent an apartment together,
they would not encounter the same problems as a cohabiting
couple would. In contrast, the benefits enumerated above are
not available at all to those who are not married.24 2 The need
to distinguish between married and unmarried couples which
exists in other contexts does not exist in the context of
housing.243
It is also critical to correctly identify the government's
interest. The issue is not whether the state should eliminate
marital status discrimination in all areas of the law, but
rather only in the area of housing. The prospective tenants
did not demand from the court, in any of the cases mentioned
above, that all distinctions made by the laws between mar-
ried and unmarried couples be eliminated. 244 The issue
before the court in each instance was limited solely to the
housing arena.2 45 Therefore, instead of assessing the state
interest in eradicating discrimination in general, it is advisa-
ble to focus on the particular type of discrimination, i.e. dis-
crimination in housing. If access to housing is a basic human
need, as it has been described, then providing discrimination-
free access to housing should be characterized as a compel-
ling state interest.
It has been argued that not every form of discrimination
is equally invidious,246 and that, in fact, there is a spectrum
of intensity of state interest with respect to the various cate-
gories.247 However, Pines v. Tomson, a California appellate
court case, poses a more persuasive argument: "as a general
proposition 'government has a compelling interest in eradi-
241. See supra note 195.
242. See supra note 45.
243. See supra note 195.
244. See supra part II.
245. See supra part II.
246. See supra note 45.
247. See supra note 82.
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cating discrimination in all forms.'" 248  The minutiae of
weighing and relating the various categories to each other,
such as race, religion, color, sex, marital and family status,
are better left to the legislature. The same applies to assess-
ing the weight of the categories allegedly existing within the
marital status category, such as single parents, the divorced,
the widowed, and others.249
2. Landlords' Interest
Do landlords have a compelling interest in being exempt
from the statute which prohibits discrimination on the basis
of marital status? It is assumed that even though the type of
discrimination discussed here occurs in a commercial context,
the level of interest the state must prove is not thereby low-
ered.250 However, once the landlords enter the public market-
place, their right to freedom of religious expression is no
longer protected absolutely. Therefore, the fact that the land-
lords engaged in a commercial activity while attempting to
obtain a religious freedom exemption may weigh against the
landlords in the final balancing of interests.25 1
It is important that landlords understand the implica-
tions of entering a heavily regulated business. Landlords are
free to profess and adhere to their religious beliefs; however,
their conduct prompted by religion may be, and has been,
subject to limitations.2 52 When landlords offer for rent units
in which they do not intend to live, they engage in a commer-
cial activity. As a result, they subject themselves to stringent
248. Pines v. Tomson, 206 Cal. Rptr. 866,879 (Ct. App. 1984) (quoting EEOC
v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 488 (5th Cir. 1980)).
249. See supra note 45.
250. See Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32,
43 (Ct. App. 1991), rev. granted and opinion superseded, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal.
1992), rev. dismissed, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993).
251. See supra text accompanying note 159.
252. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963). The Sherbert
Court stated:
The door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against any
governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such .... On the other
hand, the Court has rejected challenges under the Free Exercise
Clause to governmental regulation of certain overt acts prompted by
religious beliefs or principles, for 'even when the action is in accord
with one's religious convictions, [it] is not totally free from legislative
restrictions.'
Id. (alteration in original); see also Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 762 P.2d 46, 56
(Cal. 1988) for similar language.
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anti-discrimination regulations.253 It is not the promptings
of their religious conscience that made the landlords enter
the rental market. Therefore, they should refrain from limit-
ing the regulations which govern the housing arena in an at-
tempt to conform the law to their own religious beliefs.2 54
Section 12955 of the California Government Code, which
prohibits discrimination in housing, does not itself prohibit
the practice of religion. The landlords themselves, by inject-
ing their religious mores into the housing arena, become sub-
ject to the statute and its "unwelcome" consequences. Simi-
larly, the anti-discrimination statute does not require
landlords to aid and abet sinners.255 As a consequence, the
burden on the landlords if an exemption is not granted is not
heavy.
On the other hand, the burden on the state would be sub-
stantial if exemptions from anti-discrimination laws were al-
lowed. As the United States Supreme Court pointed out in
the Peyote Case, disorder and confusion would be imminent if
exemptions from civil obligations were available to anyone
who professed a genuine religious belief on any matter regu-
lated by the law.256 For example, the state would be unable
to uniformly enforce anti-discrimination statutes. Due to the
lack of uniform application, such statutes would become inef-
fective. If exemptions from anti-discrimination statutes were
freely available, the reasons for their existence would become
moot. 25 7 As a result, the state goal of eliminating discrimina-
tion would be hindered by such exemptions.258
253. Even those landlords who intend to live in the same single family dwell-
ing with one tenant are obligated to comply with California Government Code
§ 12955(c), which prohibits discriminatory notices, statements, and advertise-
ments. See CAL. GOVT CODE § 12927(c) (Deering Supp. 1995); see also supra
note 55.
254. See supra text accompanying note 198.
255. See Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32,
49 (Ct. App. 1991), rev. granted and opinion superseded, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal.
1992), rev. dismissed, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993) (Grignon, J., dissenting). "A
legal compulsion... to refrain from discriminating against [prospective ten-
ants) on the basis of [marital status] can hardly be characterized as an endorse-
ment" or the aiding or abetting of sin. Id. (Grignon, J., dissenting) (quoting
Pines v. Tomson, 206 Cal. Rptr. 866, 878 (1984) (citation omitted).
256. See supra note 31.
257. See supra note 31.
258. See supra note 31.
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V. PROPOSAL
The California Supreme Court should avoid deliberations
on the issue of whether it is viable to eliminate all distinc-
tions in the laws between married and unmarried couples. In
the case of the landlady, Smith, and her prospective tenants,
Randall and Phillips, the court should focus specifically on
eliminating marital status discrimination in the context of
housing.
First, the court should state that there is no practical
need to ascertain the genuine nature of bonds between a
couple in the context of access to housing, unlike other areas
of the law.2 59 Any reason for preferring married couples over
unmarried couples, which may occur in other situations, does
not exist in the housing arena. The court should hold that
married and unmarried couples enjoy the same measure of
protection in housing.
Recognizing that testing the genuineness of a relation-
ship is irrelevant in the context of housing laws will highlight
the need to eliminate marital status discrimination in that
area. In addition, it will underscore the necessity to maintain
the distinctions between married and unmarried couples in
other contexts.26 0 Testing the genuine nature of the bonds
between couples will be done only where it is necessary and
feasible. 26 1 Distinguishing between housing situations and
other legal situations in which such a test is practicable
262
will help to properly characterize the state interests involved
in each. Thus, by more accurately assessing the state inter-
est in eradicating housing discrimination, courts will be able
to balance the interests of the prospective tenants and the
landlord more precisely.
The California Supreme Court should explicitly recog-
nize that the term "marital status" in housing applies to both
259. See supra notes 46, 195. In Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988),
the California Supreme Court stated: "The policy favoring marriage is 'rooted in
the necessity of providing an institutional basis for defining the fundamental
relational rights and responsibilities of persons in organized society.'" Elden,
758 P.2d at 587. Thus, similar to the language of the Alaska Supreme Court in
Swanner, the language points to marriage as a useful tool in determining the
rights and responsibilities that a couple have towards each other. See also
supra part IV.B.1.
260. See supra notes 45, 195.
261. See supra note 262.
262. See supra note 45.
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married and unmarried couples.263 Explicit inclusion of un-
married couples within the meaning of the term "marital sta-
tus" will dispel any doubts and uncertainties regarding its
use. Recognition of prohibition against marital status dis-
crimination as protecting unmarried couples will constitute a
logical interpretation of the term and will produce consis-
tency in its application.2 64
Second, the court should refuse the landlady a religious
exercise exemption from section 12955 of the California Gov-
ernment Code. Since section 12955 is an anti-discrimination
statute, and since the government has a compelling interest
in eliminating invidious discrimination, the burden on the
state would be too great if such an exemption was granted.
The court should note that if the State allowed exemptions
from anti-discrimination laws, citizens would practically be
denied the protection of those laws.265 Such laws would be-
come ineffective.266 In addition, the court should point out
that the State would experience increased difficulty in effi-
ciently administering laws, because anti-discrimination laws
would be subject to approval by the religious conscience of
each and every citizen. As a result, the State would not be
able to enforce the laws in which it has a compelling interest
in enforcing.267
The proposed approach will help maintain the integrity
of the legal system because it will produce consistency and
predictability in the area of housing and other areas of com-
mercial enterprise. It will also prevent the danger of disorder
and confusion which could occur upon granting religious ex-
ercise exemptions from anti-discrimination laws.268
The court should adopt the proposals without waiting for
the California Legislature to amend the Government Code.269
263. See supra notes 45, 195.
264. See supra part V.A.
265. See supra note 31.
266. See supra note 31.
267. See supra note 31.
268. See supra note 31 and text accompanying note 186.
269. In his dissent in Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988), Justice
Broussard stated that the court has a "responsibility for the upkeep of the com-
mon law." Id. at 594 (Broussard, J., dissenting). Justice Broussard stated
further:
The inherent capacity of the common law for growth and change is its
most significant feature. Its development has been determined by the
social needs of the community which it serves. It is constantly ex-
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Despite the above proposals directed at the California
Supreme Court, however, the legislature should also act. The
California Legislature ought to include a definition of marital
status in the FEHA which will make the scope of the term
clear. Inclusion of the language depicted below, in section
12926(h) of the FEHA, will eliminate any doubts as to the
legislative intent regarding the meaning of the term "marital
status."27 ° It will also ensure that the term is construed in
conformity with other parts of the statute.2 71
In addition, the legislature should make it explicit that
denying access to housing due to race, sex, religion, color, or
marital or family status is equally invidious and, therefore,
equally condemned. The inclusion of such language in the
FEHA will relieve the courts from having to speculate about
the relative importance of the enumerated categories in the
area of housing discrimination. All the categories should be
accorded the same level of privilege in the area of housing,
since the statute does not distinguish among them.272 All the
categories are irrelevant as to a person's ability to pay for
housing, which ultimately is the main concern of a landlord.
Consequently, all of them should be equally protected.
Section 12926 of the FEHA should, therefore, be
amended by including the following italicized language in the
definitions pertaining to housing discrimination:
§ 12926. Definitions regarding unlawful practices As
used in this part in connection with unlawful practices,
unless a different meaning clearly appears from the
context:
(h) "Marital status" includes the presence or absence of
marriage with regard to individuals or couples.
panding and developing in keeping with advancing civilization and the
new conditions and progress of society, and adapting itself to the grad-
ual change of trade, commerce, arts, invention, and the needs of the
country. [Citations]... But that vitality can flourish only so long as the
courts remain alert to their obligation and opportunity to change the
common law when reason and equity demand it.
Id. at 594-95 (Broussard, J., dissenting) (citing Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel,
12 Cal. 3d 382, 394 (1974)) (modification in original) (emphasis added).
270. See infra text accompanying note 277; see also supra part II.B.1. and
text accompanying notes 58-65.
271. It will be construed in conformity with California Government Code
§ 12925(d), which defines the term "person." See supra note 65.
272. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12955 (Deering Supp. 1995).
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(k) "On the bases enumerated in this part" means or re-
fers to discrimination on the basis of one or more of the
following: race, religious creed, color, national origin, an-
cestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical con-
dition, marital status, sex, or age. All these bases are to be
afforded the same quality of protection from
discrimination.
VI. CONCLUSION
This comment has explored the issue of religious exercise
exemptions from a California anti-discrimination statute.
California case law, the rules of statutory interpretation, and
court decisions from other jurisdictions support the argument
that the term "marital status" applies to unmarried
couples.2 73 The State of California has a compelling interest
in preventing marital status discrimination in housing.
Therefore, the courts in California should not grant a reli-
gious exercise exemption from an anti-discrimination statute.
Malgorzata (Margo) K Laskowska
273. See discussion supra part II.
1995] 255

